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ABSTRACT: 
 
This article proposes a Kleinian re-working of Freud’s “The Uncanny” through an 
exploration of Arthur Schnitzler’s “Flowers” and Dream Story, works in which female 
figures appear to return from the dead to persecute the living.   It argues that these women 
may be seen to be animated by Melanie Klein’s insights into infantile aggression.  Starting 
with a discussion of Freud’s essay “The Uncanny” and the recent critical response to it, the 
article then explores in depth the significance of the persecutory women in the two stories. In 
both, these “uncanny” female bodies are experienced as coming to life in order to launch a 
deadly attack. The article concludes that the “Kleinian Uncanny” is a powerful critical tool 
for the analysis of Schnitzler’s texts. 
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Arthur Schnitzler’s prose writings are, quite literally, haunted by dead female figures 
who come to life once more. This article will give a reading of Schnitzler’s “Flowers” 
(“Blumen”) (1894) and Dream Story (Traumnovelle) (1926) in the light of Freud’s the 
“Uncanny” (“Das Unheimliche”) and Klein’s writings on infantile anxiety and aggression.1  
My purpose in doing so is twofold: first, I would like to explore an aspect of Schnitzler’s 
writings which has hitherto been overlooked by critics and which I will show to be vital for 
an understanding of his work as a whole. Second, I aim to show that by giving a reading of 
Schnitzler’s writings in the light of the “Uncanny” it is possible to frame a more robust 
theory of the “Uncanny” than that originally proposed by Freud, one which takes Kleinian 
aggression into account. This article enables us simultaneously to re-view Schnitzler and to 
re-view and re-imagine the psychoanalytic model through which this re-viewing takes place. 
Fictional and theoretical texts will therefore mutually illuminate one another. Freud famously 
wrote in 1919 that “the Uncanny” is in fact “something that has been repressed and now 
returns” in an estranged form2: the purpose of this article is to shed new light on what is in 
fact returning. Indeed, I would argue that Freud’s seminal theory of the “Uncanny” does not 
go nearly far enough in addressing the “Uncanny” in literary and cultural studies and it is 
time to allow Klein her rightful place in giving voice to what truly constitutes the “Uncanny”. 
It is only through examining the “uncanny” aspect of Schnitzler that we can come to a deeper 
understanding of Schnitzler’s prose works and, indeed, of the “Uncanny” itself. 
Schnitzler is best known for social satire, bittersweet comedies which expose the 
hypocrisy and self-deception of fin-de-siècle Viennese society. In plays such as La Ronde 
(1903) and Flirtations (1895), he lays bare the Viennese soul: characters deceive themselves 
and one another in the endless pursuit of desire. Yet his prose writings are very different in 
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atmosphere. Despite their skilful use of irony and humour, Schnitzler’s prose writings are in 
fact profoundly and disturbingly “uncanny”. The sense of alienation which pervades the 
“Uncanny” could also be said to permeate Schnitzler’s prose writings. They are pervaded by 
a wistful sense of melancholy, mournfulness and decay. It is this melancholy element which 
precipitates his characters into morbid thoughts and death. Certain of Schnitzler’s short 
stories and novellas in particular, “Flowers” (1894), “The Murderer” (1910), Dying (1892), 
Dead Men Tell No Tales (1897), Dream Story (1926), even his novel The Road to the Open 
(1908) - these prose works are peopled by dead bodies, by characters who already seem to 
half-inhabit a penumbral, shadowy world in which death beckons. In many cases characters 
seem destined for death and frequently choose suicide. In fact, characters seem almost by 
definition to be potentially suicidal from the outset, either consciously or unconsciously. And 
what is most striking of all is the extent to which characters are, quite literally, haunted by 
ghostly characters or images of ghostliness which taint and poison their existence with 
phantasies of death to the point where these characters are very nearly precipitated to their 
real or phantasied deaths too.3 These ghostly characters seem almost to lean back into life in 
order to snatch the living characters down into the abyss of death with them and death is 
presented as very seductive.  
Edgar Allan Poe famously wrote that: “The death of a beautiful woman is, 
unquestionably, the most poetical topic in the world.”4 In her analysis of Poe’s life and works, 
the psychoanalyst Marie Bonaparte argued that Poe’s obsession with beautiful, dead women 
who haunt the protagonist or, in the words of the critic Lisa Downing, “a dead and 
resurrected female beloved”5, stems from the Oedipus complex and the death of Poe’s 
mother, Elizabeth Arnold. Bonaparte argues that: “In order that Poe might become the kind 
of artist he was, a woman had first to die.”6 In her analysis of Poe’s story, “The Oval 
Portrait”, published in 1842, Bonaparte maintains that Poe is portraying his own relationship 
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with his dying wife, Virginia. Like the artist in the story who literally paints the colour and 
life from his living wife into the portrait, the writer Poe chose Virginia as his wife because 
she was marked out for death: 
And, just as a painter poses a living woman for Venus or The Virgin, although in his mind’s-eye he 
reconstructs some ideal image from his past, so Poe, when in his tales he paints his dying Virginia’s 
poses, always reproduces the great mother’s image that gleams through.7 
For Bonaparte, therefore, stories such as “The Oval Portrait” and “Ligeia”, and poems such 
as “Annabel Lee”, all give expression to Poe’s unresolved Oedipus complex, his unconscious 
longing for union with the dead mother.  
In Schnitzler, death is a party filled with dead female figures, and everyone wants to 
join. These ghostly figures are mostly images of dead female characters, but in some cases, 
such as in Dying it is a male character who seeks to drag the Other into death with them. My 
argument will be that this ability to haunt is not in fact determined by gender, but springs 
instead from the aggression so vividly depicted by Klein in her accounts of female 
aggression. The characters in Schnitzler’s shorts stories are, therefore, quite literally, haunted 
by death and by deathly figures, who are imagined as coming to life with deadly intent.  It is 
this aspect of Schnitzler’s writings which I propose to explore in this article.   
That death is presented as seductive and alluring in Schnitzler’s fiction is perhaps not in 
itself so surprising, given the Viennese obsession with death, epitomized by the Museum of 
Funeral History located at the Central Cemetery.  I will argue, however, that it is the 
aggressive nature of these phantasies which renders a reading of the “Uncanny” in a Kleinian 
light so compelling. In these stories, dead people or objects which emanate from them come 
to “uncanny” life, become re-animated, and seem to call those who desire them to the grave.  
It is a call which is hard to resist because the erotic and the “Uncanny” are so powerfully 
fused in Schnitzler‘s writings. In this article I will show how desire and “the Uncanny” are 
inextricably intertwined, so that erotic love becomes love for death in the phantasies of 
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Schnitzler’s protagonists.  For the critic Martin Swales, sexual encounter in Schnitzler’s 
writings is given a heightened whiff of adventure through its association with death.8 This 
may well be so, but it does not go nearly far enough in addressing the truly “uncanny” appeal 
of death in Schnitzler. Whereas the proximity of death may add a certain frisson to a sexual 
encounter, the real question is why this is the case and how we can speak about the appeal of 
death in Schnitzler. Characters are not only rendered more desirable through their association 
with death, but they are desirable precisely because of it: characters in Schnitzler desire other 
characters precisely because they are dying or already dead. This is crystallized in particular 
in the representation of the body.9 The fusion of the erotic and the “uncanny” is mapped on to 
the portrayal of the body, which therefore becomes what I would like to term the “uncanny” 
body. In my analysis of Schnitzler in the light of the “Uncanny”, therefore, I will highlight 
three recurring strands, which are all inextricably intertwined: aggression, the fusion of the 
erotic and death, and the “uncanny” body.  I will begin by giving a brief overview of Freud’s 
“Uncanny” and the critical response to it, which will lead to a Kleinian re-working of the 
“Uncanny” through Schnitzler’s “Flowers” and Dream Story. 
 
 
 
Freud 
I will now give an account of insights revealed in Freud’s famous essay, “The Uncanny”, 
published in 1919. I will then proceed to discuss critics’ response to the concept of the 
“Uncanny”, in order to highlight the gap which a reading of the “Uncanny” in the light of 
Klein can fill. In doing so, I will seek to problematize and re-formulate Freud’s theorization 
of the “Uncanny” through the theoretical writings of Klein. 
In 1919 Freud published “The Uncanny” in which he traced the feeling of the 
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“uncanny”, that which is “unheimlich”, back to what has been repressed in that which is 
“heimlich”, the ‘homely‘. “The uncanny”, Freud argues, “is that species of the frightening 
that goes back to what was once well known and had long been familiar.”10 The “Uncanny”, 
therefore, is that which has been repressed and re-emerges within the home, the safe place. In 
his analysis of E.T.A. Hoffmann’s “The Sandman” (1816), Freud famously argued that, “the 
sense of the uncanny attaches directly to the figure of the Sand-Man and therefore to the idea 
of being robbed of one’s eyes”.11 The Sand-Man, Freud asserts in this essay, appears as the 
“disruptor of love”12 and stands in for the dreaded father at whose hands the boy-child fears 
castration. Freud continues in his masterly way:  
These and many other features of the tale appear arbitrary and meaningless if one rejects the relation 
between fear for the eyes and fear of castration, but they become meaningful as soon as the Sand-Man 
is replaced by the dreaded father, at whose hands castration is expected13 
 
For Freud, therefore, the “uncanny” effect is created through proximity to the castration 
complex. Freud theorizes the “uncanny” as the return of the repressed, namely the fear of 
castration, which is awakened by fear of losing one’s eyes, blindness. This fear of castration 
is “something that should have remained hidden and has come into the open”.14  
For Freud, animated parts of the body in fictional texts give rise to a feeling of the 
“uncanny”:  
Severed limbs, a severed head, a hand detached from the arm (…) feet that dance by themselves (…) – 
all of these have something highly uncanny about them, especially when they are credited, as in the last 
instance, with independent activity.  We already know that this species of the uncanny stems from its 
proximity to the castration complex.15 
  
Thus Freud opens up the question of the feeling of the “Uncanny” aroused by the animation 
of parts of the body, but he does not take this idea further himself. I will return to this 
important idea later, when I seek to re-view the “Uncanny” through the Kleinian optic. 
For Freud, the “Uncanny” is characterized by repetition. The repressed returns over and 
over again, repetitively. Indeed, Freud argues that “anything that can remind us of this inner 
compulsion to repeat is perceived as uncanny”.16 It would therefore seem to be the function of 
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the repetition itself which is “uncanny”. In an illuminating essay entitled, “Stifter and the 
Postmodern Sublime”, Michael Minden highlights the link between this “compulsion to 
repeat” and the death-instinct, which Freud elaborated in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” 
(1920).17 Minden argues that: 
The persistence of the pattern of repetition in the life of the mind is finally evidence of a disposition in 
human mental life untouched by pleasure or any affirmative moment whatsoever, but rather driven by the 
trajectory of all organisms towards the inorganic state. Uncanniness is thus for Freud an experience of 
the mind in which the death instinct (our sense of our finitude as our most intimate possession) is 
manifest in the very figure - not the content - of repetition.  Put another way, the kind of return of the 
repressed which we experience as uncanny (ie a recognition of the unfamiliar), is evidence of the death 
instinct.18  
 
For Minden, the very repetition which constitutes the “Uncanny” comes from the death 
instinct. In highlighting repetition as constitutive of the “Uncanny”, Minden emphasizes an 
important point about the very repetition as “Uncanny” in itself. This is of direct relevance to 
a Kleinian account of the “Uncanny”. For Klein, the death-instinct is the “instinct of 
aggression”;19 thus the repetition which, for Minden, comes from the death instinct could at 
one and the same time be seen to be the Kleinian “instinct of aggression” which returns 
repeatedly. 
The “Uncanny” has a privileged relationship to the visual, to visuality. As Nicholas 
Royle writes in his book, The uncanny: “it is not so much darkness itself (whatever that may 
be) but the process of ceasing to be dark, the process of revelation or bringing to light, that is 
uncanny”.20 The “Uncanny” seems, at least for Freud, to involve a “special emphasis on the 
visual, on what comes to light, on what is revealed to the eye”.21  Paul de Man writes on the 
“uncanny”, “to make the invisible visible is uncanny”.22 This process of becoming visible is 
highly relevant for the texts examined in this article, since the visual objects of the male 
protagonists’ respective gazes come to life and take them over. 
At the same time, Freud placed a special emphasis on the blurring between fantasy and 
reality in his account of the “Uncanny”: “… an uncanny effect often arises when the 
boundary between fantasy and reality is blurred”.23 This blurring between fantasy and reality 
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will also be of importance when we turn to our analysis of the “Uncanny” in the light of 
Klein, because the distinction between internal and external reality is a cornerstone of 
Kleinian theory. Donald Meltzer describes Klein’s insight as follows: 
[She] made a discovery that created a revolutionary addition to the model of the mind, namely, that we 
do not live in one world, but in two – that we live in an internal world which is as real a place to live as 
the outside world (…) Psychic reality could be treated in a concrete way.24  
 
Schnitzler’s masterful skill in blurring these two worlds is one of the principal cornerstones 
of his success in bringing the “Uncanny” to life in his prose writings, in particular in 
“Flowers” and in Dream Story. 
 
 
Critical response to the ‘Uncanny’ 
In recent years, critics have begun to explore the exciting potential offered by Freud’s 
theorization of the “Uncanny”. I will give a brief overview of recent developments in the 
field of the “Uncanny”; the purpose of this is to take the reader through them and show how 
their recent insights lead directly to and complement those offered by Klein. Klein’s insights, 
in turn, could be seen to lead to a re-formulation and re-fashioning of the Freudian 
“Uncanny” in the light of her clinical insights.   
Royle, in his extensive and multi-faceted study of “The Uncanny”, has observed that 
the “Uncanny” is self-reflexive and represents something that is constantly shifting: 
There is, in short, something strange about the qualities of Freud’s text: sometimes a passage or a single 
sentence can appear to open up entirely new worlds of thought. At other times it can seem strangely 
incoherent, curiously repetitive and inconclusive. We may feel, on occasion, that we are ‘familiar’ with 
Freud’s text, but then something new and unexpected will shift into focus. […] More than perhaps any 
other work by Freud, ‘The Uncanny’ itself seems uncanny in the sense that it keeps doing different 
things not only to the reader but also, somehow, to itself.25 
 
Any reader of Freud’s essay on the “The Uncanny” will have encountered the same reading 
experience as Royle - the “Uncanny” eludes one’s grasp; it slips around, and every re-reading 
of the essay presents something new and different. Nonetheless, Royle does present us with a 
fascinating plethora of directions to explore in our forays into the “Uncanny”. 
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In Psychoanalytic Criticism: A Reappraisal, Elizabeth Wright describes the general 
critical consensus regarding “what Freud leaves out of Hoffmann’s tale and what he leaves 
out of psychoanalysis”.26 For Wright: 
Hoffmann’s story has a better account of the uncanny in it than the one Freud gives, both as regards 
literature and as regards psychoanalysis. But most interestingly, what Freud leaves out of Hoffmann 
transferentially strays into his long digressive essay.27 
 
Wright proceeds to argue that the “Uncanny” in fictional texts has far more narrative 
resources and strategies than Freud recognizes, for example repeated images of fire and 
blood. Freud’s failure to recognize such devices utilized by the return of the repressed signals 
a huge omission on the part of Freud and this omission spills over into his psychoanalysis.  
For Wright, interested in a feminist response, Freud’s insistence that the fear of losing one’s 
eyes represents the fear of castration overlooks the privileged relationship between the eyes 
as the most powerful organs of desire and the organs through which the child “perceives what 
the mother “lacks”.28 For Wright, Freud completely fails to take into account the implications 
of this. Above all, the radical implications of the “uncanny” for the arts have not only been 
ignored, but have somehow been denied:  
Freud produces an explanation for the uncanny in experience, as a resurgence of an infantile complex, 
or as a revisiting of an animistic mode of perception, or both, but he has none for the uncanny in 
fiction.29  
 
The artist, Wright argues, can do special things with the repressed: 
Literature and the arts can present us with forms of the uncanny that life cannot, because the writer/artist 
has more access to illusion.  He can contextualize as he wishes, choose whatever frame he likes 
(Magritte), discuss illusion (Hoffmann).  Whereas in life one is at the mercy of repetition (the repeated 
detour to the brothel Freud relates in ‘The uncanny’) the artist can play with the repressed.30  
 
It is this quality of play, inherent in the aesthetic, which emerges as key for Wright.  She cites 
the uncanny objects loved by the Surrealists, “the watch that melts (Dali), the pipe that 
proclaims ‘Ceci n’est pas une pipe’ (Magritte)”.31 “The uncanny”, she argues, “is the illusory 
aspect of all objects brought home to us.”32 These “uncanny” objects may fail to satisfy our 
desires: in displaying this fact, they simultaneously proclaim and enjoy their own “uncanny” 
status. 
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Wright highlights the radical potential for aesthetics which the “uncanny” possesses, a 
radical potential which eluded its creator. However, although Freud failed to grasp the 
implications of his own discovery, other critics have succeeded in recognizing the radical 
implications of the “Uncanny”. 
Recent years have begun to see a growth of scholarship in the “Uncanny”, much of 
which has been directed towards uncovering the potential of the “Uncanny” for aesthetics, 
often in illuminating ways. For example, in “Stifter and the Postmodern Sublime”, Michael 
Minden explores why the “Uncanny” and the Sublime are so frequently found to occur 
together in the works of Adalbert Stifter.33 Minden takes as his starting point Bloom’s 
canonical statement that the “Uncanny” “is of enormous importance to literary criticism 
because it is the only major contribution that the twentieth century has made to the aesthetics 
of the Sublime”.34 Minden provides a persuasive argument for how the “Uncanny” can be 
found to produce the effect of the Sublime in Stifter, for example in the reduction of the 
landscape in Mica (1853) to a blank wasteland in which all forms have been dissolved: 
This is the landscape (…) that will be overthrown in and through its very sublimity, and become blankly 
unfamiliar. (…) Significantly, a whole life-sustaining world of forms is overthrown.35  
 
For Minden, this dissolution of forms in the landscape means that it is the “Uncanny” that 
produces the effect of the Sublime: they have become fused: the “Uncanny” has taken the 
place of the Sublime. Minden highlights another moment of fusion between the “Uncanny” 
and the Sublime, when the mother runs to greet the children returning from the storm. The 
mother, figured as “a white form”, is identified with the storm through her whiteness. She 
thus represents once again the danger that that they have just escaped, running to meet them. 
Minden writes:  
But in - fleetingly but surely unmistakeably - personifying the storm in the mother (via the colour 
white), the sublime event has been shown to be uncannily linked with that which we all regard as the 
most familiar, the most reassuring and our own: the mother’.36  
 
What Minden describes is of course the ultimate “Uncanniness”, the sense of danger and of 
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the unknowable encountered within that which should be the most familiar, the safest place, 
the mother. Here the repetition is “Uncanny” precisely because of what is being repeated 
where: the devastating storm is located within the mother herself. 
Minden succeeds very well in showing not only that Stifter is “uncanny”, but, above 
all, the way in which he is “uncanny”. His insistence that repetition generates the “Uncanny” 
is highly revealing. He quotes the way the line, “We did not meet a soul”, is repeated and 
refracted in From the Bavarian Forest (1867) and draws the consequent insight: 
We are witnessing the birth of Stifter’s late style from the spirit of the Uncanny. This style can be called 
uncanny because it makes the familiar gesture of narrative unfamiliar, because it plays disconcertingly 
between lifelessness and animation, and because it is a style of repetition.37 
 
The “Uncanny” is, therefore, for Minden, constitutive of Stifter’s late writing style. I will 
return to this point later because it is of direct relevance to repetition in Klein’s persecutors.  
He supports the assertion made by Helena Ragg-Kirkby that Stifter’s late style “bespeaks 
[…] the magnificence of utter negation”.38 For Minden, this represents the fusion of the 
“Uncanny” and the Sublime at the level of style. Yet that “utter negation” can also be seen to 
be the death-instinct at work through repetition: in other words, Klein’s “instinct of 
aggression”, returning over and over again. 
 
 
 
Klein 
The child psychoanalyst Melanie Klein (1880-1960) developed a body of theory built on 
Freud’s insights and took them in her own radical direction. Her theoretical observations are 
derived from her empirical observations of children’s behaviour, in which she highlighted the 
pivotal roles of aggression and envy in constituting object-relations. 
It is not my intention here to give an overview of all aspects of her theoretical writings.39  
 
 
 62 
Instead, I would like to highlight those aspects of her theory which are particularly relevant 
for the “Uncanny”. The theorization of the “Uncanny” and the critical response to it have 
hitherto been Freudian and Lacanian in their focus.40 I would argue, however, that, when it 
comes to the “Uncanny”, Klein reaches the parts that other theorists cannot. In fact, it is only 
through re-viewing Freud’s “Uncanny” through the Kleinian optic that we can come to a 
better understanding of what constitutes the “Uncanny” in fictional texts. My intention is to 
re-formulate the “Uncanny” in terms of Klein: this may in turn liberate potential new 
readings of fictional texts in the light of what, with tentative boldness, I would like to call the 
“Kleinian Uncanny”. 
Klein’s radical insight into aggression came from her observation of sadism in 
children’s play. Klein theorized that, from the moment it is born, the infant forms a relation to 
the mother’s breast which forms the basis for all object-relations.41 “Insofar as the breast 
gratifies the infant’s needs, it is internalized in phantasy as a “good” or “idealized” breast, 
whereas the breast which frustrates the infant is internalized as the “bad” breast”.42 For the 
first six months of life, Klein argues, the infant is under the sway of what Klein terms “the 
paranoid-schizoid” position, in which it relates only to what she terms “part-objects”, part-
objects because they are not yet internalized in phantasy as whole objects.43 In this phase, the 
paranoid-schizoid position, the infant is dominated by internal phantasy relations to either 
very good, idealized images or very bad, persecutory objects. The mechanism of splitting into 
either very “good”, “idealized” objects or very “bad”, “persecutory” ones is a way for the 
rudimentary infantile ego to protect the internalized “good” object from the infant’s own 
aggression: through the mechanism of splitting, the “good”, “idealized” object is protected 
from the subject’s own sadism. The fact that these objects are felt to be very persecutory is, I 
would argue, highly significant for an understanding of the “Uncanny”. I will now explore 
this crucial aspect of Klein.   
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For Klein, the objects in the paranoid-schizoid phase are felt to be persecutory precisely 
because the infant phantasizes that the sadism which it has projected on to the internal “bad” 
object returns in retaliation to persecute it:  
For it is because the baby projects its own aggression on to these objects that it feels them to be ’bad’ and 
not only in that they frustrate its desires: the child conceives of them as actually dangerous - persecutors 
who it fears will devour it, scoop out the inside of its body, cut it to pieces, poison it - in short, 
compassing its destruction by all the means which sadism can devise.44  
 
For Klein, persecution plays a huge role in the infant’s phantasy life. It is important to 
emphasize that in Klein these persecutors are imagined as plural, returning in retaliation 
against the infant, and that the attacks take the form of sadistic attacks upon the body.  These 
aggressive attacks are the very same ones which the infant has in phantasy inflicted upon the 
mother’s body and, in phantasy, they are imagined to take place repeatedly. The “repressed”, 
in this case, phantasied aggressive attacks, returns repeatedly to haunt the infant.  
Klein’s essay “Infantile Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and In the 
Creative Impulse” (1929).45 is crucial for an understanding of the way aggression and fears of 
persecution work in Klein, and, as a consequence, it is hugely illuminating for a potential 
Kleinian exploration of the “Uncanny”.  In “Infantile Anxiety Situations”, Klein gives a 
Kleinian reading of an opera by Ravel, whose story she takes from a review by Eduard Jakob 
in the newspaper Berliner Tageblatt.46 
A child of six years old gets bored in his lessons and, in response to his proclamation 
that “I’d like best of all to eat up all the cake in the world”, he is told that, “You shall have 
dry bread and no sugar in your tea!”47 Presented with this oral frustration, he unleashes his 
infantile sadism upon the objects in the room: he smashes the tea-pot and cup into “a 
thousand pieces”,48 tries to stab the squirrel in its cage, pokes the fire furiously with the tongs, 
tears the wallpaper, pulls the pendulum out of the grandfather-clock and pours ink over the 
table. The objects of his attack retaliate: 
The things he has maltreated come to life. An armchair refuses to let him sit in it or have the cushions to 
sleep on.  Table, chair, bench and sofa suddenly lift up their arms and cry: ‘Away with the dirty little 
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creature!’ The clock has a dreadful stomach-ache and begins to strike the hours like mad. The tea-pot 
leans over the cup, and they begin to talk Chinese. Everything undergoes a terrifying change. The child 
falls back against the wall and shudders with fear and desolation. The stove spits out a shower of sparks 
at him. (…) The shreds of the torn wallpaper begin to sway and stand up, showing shepherdesses and 
sheep. (…) the rent in the paper, which separates Corydon from his Amaryllis, has become a rent in the 
fabric of the world! 49 
 
What is important here is that the objects upon which the boy has inflicted his aggression 
come to life and attack him with all the means at their disposal. They are literally animated in 
retaliation against him and it is aggression which animates them, nothing else. This will be of 
pivotal importance when it comes to addressing the “Uncanny” from a Kleinian perspective. 
Frightened, the boy runs into the garden where he encounters a terrifying array of 
animals who attack him. In a fight which ensues, a squirrel falls wounded to the ground and 
the boy ‘instinctively takes off his scarf and binds up the little creature’s paw’.50 For Klein, 
this can clearly be seen as an act of reparation,51 the desire to repair which stems from 
“depressive”52 concern that the object has been damaged in phantasy. The child “is restored to 
the human world of helping”.53 
However, I am more concerned here with Klein’s vivid depictions of infantile sadism 
and her reading of them. She interprets the attack on the squirrel in the cage and the 
pendulum in the clock as attacks on the mother’s body and the father’s penis within it. The 
tearing of the wallpaper, which separates ‘Corydon from his Amaryllis’54 is similarly read as 
an attack on the united parents in the act of coitus. Klein goes on to give a vivid account of 
the weapons used by the boy:  
The ink poured over the table, the emptied kettle, from which a cloud of ashes and steam escapes, 
represent the weapon which very little children have at their disposal: namely the device of soiling with 
excrement. Smashing things, tearing them up, using the tongs as a sword - these represent the other 
weapons of the child’s primary sadism, which employs his teeth, nails, muscles and so on.55  
 
The weapons used by the boy are therefore in phantasy the weapons at his disposal - these are 
weapons of the body, directed in phantasy at the mother’s body. 
The objects attacked by the boy and the animals in the garden become transformed in 
phantasy into myriads of persecutors who attack him. As we shall see when we look at the 
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“Uncanny” through Klein, the plural nature of the persecutors will be significant. Klein 
writes:  
The hostile animals represent a multiplication of the father, whom he has also attacked, together with the 
children assumed to be in the mother. (…)  The world, transformed into the mother’s body, is in hostile 
array against the child and persecutes him.56 
 
The world, therefore, becomes transformed into myriads of persecutors, who rise up in 
hostile array against the child. In the child’s phantasy, these persecutors will be Legion and 
they are figured as very dynamic. In “A Contribution to The Psychogenesis of Manic-
Depressive States”, Klein writes that “to the paranoiac the disintegrated object is mainly a 
multitude of persecutors, since each piece is growing again into a persecutor”.57 The object, 
therefore, which has been smashed to pieces in phantasy becomes myriads of persecutors, in 
which each fragmented piece is a persecutor in its own right. Fragmentation is thus 
represented as a highly dangerous process. 
I have examined Klein’s “Infantile Anxiety Situations” in considerable detail because it 
is absolutely essential in order to illustrate Klein’s relevance to the “Uncanny”. It is here that 
the myriads of persecutors which are a cornerstone of Klein’s theoretical writings most 
vividly come to life. They are the dynamic enactment of infantile aggression and retaliation. 
It will be obvious that my primary focus is on the negativity within Klein, the 
destructive power of her aggression, rather than the reparative thrust of her narratives, in 
which reparation makes whole the object which has been smashed to pieces in phantasy.  
This is because her most radical insights come out of these vividly depicted phantasies of 
aggression which are profoundly disturbing and destabilizing. Yet the radical power of 
Klein’s insights extends far beyond themselves: they enable us to read the “Uncanny” in a 
new way and see what we could not see before. Wright highlights Klein’s potential for 
readings which do not seek to cosset the reader in reparative closure, but instead give voice to 
ambiguity, ambivalence and the disruptive power of negativity.58 Jacqueline Rose, meanwhile, 
has argued for a reading of Klein which would liberate negativity from what has essentially 
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been its repression within psychoanalytic discourse.59 For Rose, the humanities have 
“aestheticized psychoanalysis, bypassing other points of (greater) friction”.60 This, I would 
argue, is what has hitherto happened to discussions of the “Uncanny”: psychoanalytic 
accounts have hitherto failed to give aggression their rightful place. 
 
 
Webber and the animated robot Maria 
In an illuminating study entitled, “Canning the Uncanny: The Construction of Visual Desire 
in Metropolis”, Andrew Webber gives a reading of Fritz Lang’s Metropolis in the light of the 
“Uncanny”, focusing primarily on Freud and Lacan. Webber identifies the figure of the robot 
Maria, played by Brigitte Helm, as a “phallic” woman61. The phallic woman functions as a 
fetish, signalling and covering up the lack that is castration.  For Webber, the “Uncanny” 
conjured up by the image of the phallic woman here simultaneously re-affirms and subverts 
patriarchy. Webber argues that the image of the “phallic” woman is projected on to the film 
screen, and in doing so, its status as filmic image, as part of the film medium itself is 
emphasized in a plethora of “uncanny” ways. Webber’s analysis of Metropolis focuses in 
particular on the gaze and the fetish. Webber’s reading, as a Freudian and Lacanian reading, 
is imbricated with an awareness of the way sexuality and the shimmering process of image-
making are inextricably intertwined: it functions beautifully as such. My purpose here, 
however, is to take his insights a stage further and to implicate Klein in Webber’s reading 
such that a new way of reading may emerge.   
Webber analyses certain key scenes in the film where the “Uncanny” and the process of 
creating the image of the female body as an alluring filmic image interpenetrate and mutually 
illuminate one another. For example, in the scene in which the laboratory process creates the 
robot Maria, the image of Brigitte Helm is projected on to the robot, which: 
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simulates sex in its mounting excitement of moving parts and frothing fluids.  Its key focus, however, is 
on the immobile object of the automaton and the rings of light which seek to electrify it into life by their 
massaging movement.62 
 
This is interpreted by Webber, therefore, as a sex act between phallus and hand, and, when 
the robot Maria emerges as the triumphant sex object, exposed in all her sexual glory to the 
scopic male gaze, she is the ultimate fetish: 
what comes in the climax of this simulation is the successful simulation of the female figure, but 
always in the shape of the phallus; a female figure which is above all constructed according to the 
psychoanalytic specifications of the fetish, that is as an object which is designed to make up for lack, a 
perfectly engineered prosthesis.63 
 
Webber emphasizes the status of the robot Maria both as phallic woman and fetish. She 
arouses feelings of the “Uncanny” due to her proximity to the castration complex. 
Webber’s essay is a seminal reading of Metropolis in the light of the “Uncanny”, 
revealing new areas of exploration. However, I would like to build on Webber’s insights and 
extend the implications of his argument beyond his original intention. Webber dwells for the 
most part on the robot Maria as the passive object of the male scopic gaze, although he does 
highlight her “uncanny” laughter as she burns. What he overlooks is the fact that, in the 
laboratory animation scene, the robot Maria is brought to life as a persecutor. The robot 
Maria is brought to life with only one purpose, and that is to deal death. Her highly 
persecutory essence is revealed from the very first moments of her animation, from her 
triumphant laughter, brittle, aggressive gestures, and her identification with a death’s head. 
Webber interprets the overlaying of her image with that of a “death’s head” as due to the fear 
of castration which she signifies.64 This, however, is to underplay the very real threat of death 
which she embodies.   
And this is the point: the robot Maria literally embodies the threat of death. Her body 
and her threatening gaze, in particular her mouth, which opens in order to proclaim death-
dealing laughter, are animated in order to attack; they incarnate the rampant desires of the 
Kleinian infant to inflict sadistic attacks upon the object which deprives it of satisfaction. 
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Even the robot Maria’s sex dance, which Webber reads as the dance of the phallic woman to 
gratify the scopic male gaze,65 can be read as the dance of a persecutor which enacts a 
triumphant, death-dealing dance: it is a dance of phantasied revenge. The proliferation of 
eyes which Webber sees as the signifiers of “the compulsively repetitive representation of the 
primal lack which is castration”,66 could equally be read as the proliferation of persecutors, 
which return in retaliation to wreak their vengeance upon the infant. Their very proliferation, 
which to Webber signifies excess in order to “represent lack” can, with a Kleinian twist, be 
seen as myriads of persecutors.67 In a Kleinian reading, the robot Maria could be read as the 
bad, “persecutory” internal object, come to life in retaliation for phantasied sadistic attacks.  
Indeed, the robot Maria is very lively indeed, very aggressive, and she uses her body as a 
weapon, just like the Kleinian child. 
My argument, therefore, is that Kleinian aggression should fully be brought into the 
equation of the “Uncanny”. I would argue that this is the link which Freud and subsequent 
critics missed and which only a Kleinian analysis can reveal. Only a Kleinian refraction of 
the “Uncanny” can help us to understand what energies fuel the “Uncanny”. Fear of 
castration is, as critics such as Royle have pointed out, simply not enough: not only does it 
not go far enough in addressing the question of a feminist response68, but, above all, it does 
not go far enough in explaining why the “Uncanny” is frightening. 
 
Schnitzler’s “Uncanny” 
Let us turn now to our analysis of Schnitzler’s prose fiction in the light of Klein. I will focus 
on the representation of death in two of Schnitzler’s prose pieces, the short story “Flowers” 
and the novella Dream Story. As we have seen, Schnitzler’s writings abound in images of the 
dead or potentially dead love object, most often a female figure, who has died suddenly or 
been killed, and returns in phantasy to haunt the protagonist. 
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On the surface of it, one explanation for this recurrent trope is guilt. As Swales points 
out, Schnitzler’s writings are predominantly concerned with the conflict between freedom 
and responsibility.69 Schnitzler’s male protagonists are drifters who are unable to make 
decisions, paralyzed and caught in a lethargy which is part of what makes them and their 
society so permissive. Swales, therefore, quite rightly, highlights the moral issues which 
inform Schnitzler’s writings. It is, indeed, striking, how often the trope of the dead or dying 
woman, the ghostly or shadowy female figure, is invoked as a response to the male (or very 
occasionally female) desire to be free of the responsibilities incurred by the relationship.  
Psychoanalytic criticism, however, seeks to uncover the unconscious forces at work beneath 
the shimmering textual fabric of the written text. What I wish to emphasize is the violence 
inherent to the representation of these dead or ghostly female figures.70 There is a savagery 
which underlies this element in Schnitzler and that same savagery underpins a Kleinian 
understanding of the “Uncanny”. Schnitzler’s preoccupation with guilt and the evasion of 
genuine concern and responsibility manifested by his characters go hand in hand with a 
Kleinian analysis intent upon revealing the current of aggression with which the fabric of 
Schnitzler’s texts is imbricated. For it is precisely such unresolved aggression which, for 
Klein, gives rise to the desire to flee the object which has been damaged in phantasy. 
In “Flowers”, the narrator learns that a girl with whom he was romantically involved 
has just died. We are told that he rejected her because she was unfaithful to him, but that she 
sent him many letters, begging him for forgiveness. The class implications of this are clearly 
implied by Schnitzler: she was a working-class girl, consequently more vulnerable to sexual 
advances from another man, while the narrator is a man from the upper middle classes. What 
is clear is that he rejected her quite cruelly and self-righteously: “Hadn’t she long been dead 
to me? … yes, dead, or rather, I thought to myself with the childish self-pity of a man 
betrayed, “worse than dead”…?” (“F”, 22/“B”, 220) 71 She has thus been consigned to the 
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realm of death, or, indeed, even worse, social death, by the self-pitying and self-righteous 
male narrator.  
The first-person narration strongly implies that the girl’s death is the result of her grief 
at this rejection: 
How she has been languishing for some time, but had not been in bed more than a week…What had been 
the matter with her?...”Some emotional disorder…anaemia…One can never pin those doctors down.” 
“F”, 23/“B”, 221) 
 
The narrator’s search for the cause of death reveals his attempt to hide to himself his own part 
in the girl’s death, but Schnitzler shows us his guilt clearly. In fact, the narrator seems 
completely unable to mourn her loss.72 
I had a vision of myself as cold and utterly hard –hearted.  As someone who could stand beside the 
grave into which a loved one has been lowered, without a tear, indeed without any capacity for feeling. 
(“F”, 24/“B”, 223) 
 
This inability to mourn is of crucial significance to a Kleinian understanding of the 
“Uncanny”.  For Klein, the ability to mourn the lost loved object, the object lost in phantasy 
(through the infant’s own sadism), means that the infant is able to internalize the lost good 
object. Thus, mourning is an intrinsic part of developing love and concern for the lost object.73 
Swales argues that the narrator’s “lack of feeling for the person is compensated for by the 
excess of feeling for the thing”.74  In his account, the lack of genuine feeling manifests itself in 
sentimentality, which is “shown as an outpouring of feeling on an image of experience, rather 
than on the experience itself”.75 This pouring of emotion on to “an image of experience” is a 
crucial aspect of a Kleinian reading, since, once again, it reveals the lack of love and true 
concern for the whole object, for a real person. Excessive emotion directed at an image is 
fundamentally narcissistic and veils the unresolved aggression which emerges in an estranged 
form through the “Uncanny”. 
The “Uncanny” enters the scene when the narrator receives a bunch of flowers 
from the dead girl. She has been sending him flowers every month from a flower shop as a 
memory of happy times, and the flowers arrive once more, like a greeting from beyond the 
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grave: 
There, neatly held together by a golden thread lay a bunch of violets and carnations… They lay there as 
if inside a coffin. (“F”, 25/“B”, 223) 
 
The flowers are metonymically linked to the girl; 76 they come from her, and the fact that they 
are an attribute of her melts into an image of them as a human body: they are likened to a 
human body lying inside a coffin, the body of the dead girl. The narrator touches them and 
feels “a shiver run down my spine “(“F”, 25/“B”, 223). From the beginning, therefore, their 
sensuous and corporeal attributes are highlighted and the narrator relates to them in these 
terms. He attempts to rationalize away his sense that the flowers embody the ghostly presence 
of the girl, telling himself she placed the order in the shop shortly before her demise, but then 
he is seized by the phantasy that the flowers are moving and speaking to him: 
And yet, as I held the flowers in my hand, and they seemed to tremble and incline their heads, against 
all reason and my own resolve, I could not help finding them a little uncanny, as if they came direct 
from her, as if this were her greeting… as if even now in death she still wanted to tell me of her love, 
of her – belated faithfulness. (“F”, 25/“B”, 224). 
 
The flowers, therefore, come to life, in order to tell the narrator of their love. In a Kleinian 
reading, therefore, the narrator could be seen to project his own fear of persecution into the 
flowers, which in turn become animated. So far, the activity of the flowers, telling the 
narrator of the girl’s belated fidelity, appears quite gentle, but, as I hope to show, this 
apparent gentleness will be shown to conceal an increasingly violent aspect. 
The narrator is figured as touching the flowers again and this act of touching is in 
phantasy associated with touching the body of the dead girl. He affirms that he touches the 
flowers with more delicacy than usual, as though by touching them too hard he might inflict 
harm on her body and cause the flowers to moan. The flowers are imagined here as moaning 
in pain, like a body: 
Today I tended the flowers differently, more tenderly than usual, as if gripping them too firmly might 
make them suffer… as if their quiet souls might softly start to weep. (“F”, 25/“B”, 224) 
 
The latent aggression implied in this act of touching is clearly figured. The narrator touches 
 
 
 72 
the flowers gently here in order not to cause the dead girl pain, but in phantasy he dwells on 
the thought of doing so, with more than a twinge of sexual and sadistic pleasure. In fact, he is 
also acutely aware of his power, in phantasy, to do so. Crucially, the identification between 
the flowers and the dead girl’s body is already much stronger at this point. 
The narrator becomes gradually obsessed by the presence of the flowers in his room.  
They begin to haunt him and to embody a morbid erotic force: 
The flowers are standing in the slender shimmering green vase, their stalks immersed in water, and their 
fragrance pervades the room.  They are still exuding fragrance – even though they have now been in my 
room a week and have started wilting. (“F”, 26/“B”, 224-25) 
 
The flowers seem to incarnate a phallic presence here, penetrating the water and towering 
above it, and they emanate a scent, which is emphasized.  This scent, which seems to pervade 
the room, is powerful but is beginning to be associated with death, as the flowers “have 
started wilting”. Gradually they begin to exert an erotic yet persecutory power over the 
narrator, who believes that he hears them talking and complaining constantly: 
Or rather, I am aware that they are continuously talking…even now….that they are talking and 
complaining incessantly, and that I am getting close to understanding them. (“F”, 26/“B”, 225) 
 
These flowers are gradually figured as persecutory, constantly talking in what the narrator 
feels to be an accusatory way. Their active nature is emphasized increasingly, along with 
their plurality: the more animated they become, the more persecutory they are. At the same 
time, they become more closely associated with death in their physical substance: “They have 
now completely wilted” (“F”, 27/“B”, 225)), the narrator affirms as he becomes increasingly 
cloistered alone with the dying flowers. They are dying themselves: “The petals have begun 
to fall” (“F”, 27/“B”, 225). Then they are actually dead themselves: “They are making me ill” 
(“F”, 28/“B”, 225). Not content merely to die themselves, these flowers wish to take the 
narrator with them to the grave. 
And this is my point. The energies which galvanize the flowers are experienced as 
persecutory by the narrator. The “Kleinian Uncanny” pivots upon this persecutory dynamic 
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which takes place within the powerful internal reality of the narrator.77 The attack upon the 
narrator which emanates from the flowers within this internal reality is relentless. It is an 
internal reality which we are invited to share. Schnitzler makes masterly use of strategies 
which evoke a sense of the “Uncanny" in this story, such as the blurring between phantasy 
and reality and the uncertainty as to whether the flowers are actually alive or not, the 
aforementioned characteristics of Freud’s “Uncanny”. As readers we are simultaneously 
inside the narrator’s mind and under the spell of the flowers: we feel their “uncanny” pull 
towards death. But it is only Klein who enables us to unravel why these flowers exercise such 
power over the increasingly paralyzed narrator. It is because the flowers become animated 
with the persecutory energies of the paranoid-schizoid position, even if this is veiled under 
highly civilized Schnitzlerian prose. The more dynamic they become, the more this 
dynamism can be seen to emerge as an attack on the narrator’s life. 
The narrator becomes convinced that he can see the image of the dead girl in the street, 
through his closed eyes. Only through his closed eyes does his sight acquire a new ability to 
see – an “uncanny” vision. As we have seen, the process of becoming visible is one of the 
keynotes of the Freudian “Uncanny”; it inhabits the borderline between that which is visible 
and that which is not visible: 
 
I closed my eyes.  And all at once I could see through my closed lids, and there the wretched creature 
stood in the wan light of the street lamp, and I saw her face with uncanny clarity, as though it were 
illuminated by a yellow sun, and saw those large bewildered eyes in her pale careworn face. (“F”, 8/“B”, 
226) 
 
The narrator becomes, quite literally, haunted by the image of the dead girl, an image which 
is caught between visibility and invisibility. He becomes fixated in particular by her eyes, 
which stare at him, full of mute accusation. Trapped in guilt rather than genuine remorse, her 
very presence as image becomes persecutory to him. 
Throughout the story the dead girl, and the narrator’s living girlfriend, Gretel, are 
portrayed in somewhat derogatory terms as child-like, not powerful, and not sexual. All the 
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erotic power of female sexuality seems to be projected on to the image of the flowers. As the 
narrator stares at the by now dead flowers, he is fascinated by their dead and withered state, 
and once again it is their corporeality, however repulsive, which seizes hold of his 
imagination: 
I stared at the flowers.  They are scarcely flowers at all now, no more than bare stalks, pitiful and dry. 
(“F”, 28/“B”, 227) 
 
The identification of the flowers with the body of the dead girl is here intensified. The 
flowers are characterized as “naked”, creating an association of the erotic with the flowers 
which were likened to the girl’s dead body. The narrator proceeds to associate the scent of 
putrefaction with the sensuous scent of youthful blossoming and sexuality: 
Ghosts! – They exist, they exist!  Dead things playing at being alive.  And if wilting flowers smell of 
mould, it is only in memory of the time when they were blossoming and fragrant. (“F”, 28/ “B”, 227) 
 
What could be more “uncanny” than the idea of dead things pretending to be alive, playing at 
life? The dead, rotting body of the girl becomes eroticized through the fusion of blossoming 
and mould. It is precisely because the girl is dead that her body seems to acquire an extra 
lure, an attraction she never possessed in life, the lure of putrefaction.   
Yet the attraction of the erotic “Uncanny” is double-edged: for the “dead things” are 
not content merely to be enjoyed, they are there to take their revenge on life. Their 
persecutory nature may be subtly veiled, but their intention is nothing less than to alienate the 
narrator from life and suck him down to the Underworld with them. Persecuted by constantly 
seeing the invisible dead girl and hearing her wordless speech at every turn, the narrator shuts 
the curtains and makes the whole world dead around him: 
I can let down the curtains and the sun is dead.  I decide to have nothing more to do with all those people, 
and they too are dead.  When I close the window, no scent of lilac wafts around me any longer, and the 
spring is dead. (…) And these dry stalks in the vase are mightier than any spring or scent of lilac. (“F”, 
28/ “B”, 227) 
 
Erotic sexuality fuses with persecutory energy in the image of the flowers. It is no accident 
that the flowers are invested with the properties of a sensuously arousing yet decaying female 
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body, for in a Kleinian reading this could be seen to represent phantasied attacks on the 
mother’s body. The part-objects upon which the infant has projected its sadism come to life 
in retaliation and this is experienced as very frightening: it is only by harnessing the very 
vital energies of Kleinian theory that we can begin to understand why the “Uncanny” is so 
frightening: because in its shadows lurk myriads of persecutors, ready to attack. These 
persecutory forces are capable of killing the sun, all the people, and the spring for 
Schnitzler’s narrator, who remains locked inside his own persecutory phantasies.  
The narrator is saved by another female figure, a reparative figure, who throws the dead 
flowers out of the window, replacing them with fresh lilac blooms. The spell of sadism is 
broken and the narrator is returned to the world of the living. He therefore survives the 
encounter with the myriads of persecutors - but only just. We feel as readers how precarious 
his hold on a benevolent reality has been and the story remains very haunting. Only a 
psychoanalytic reading which addresses Klein can truly give voice to its “uncanny” power. 
In Dream Story, the protagonist Fridolin undertakes a nocturnal journey into adventure 
which can be read as what Swales describes as “an allegorical journey into death”.78 Sexual 
jealousy propels the doctor Fridolin to embark upon a voyage through night-time Vienna, 
where he encounters the possibilities of sexual adventure and death. A chance encounter with 
his friend Nachtigall, who reveals that he plays the piano blindfold at orgies, compels 
Fridolin to infiltrate one such orgy. The men are clothed in monks’ habits, while the women 
wear nuns’ habits until later on when they are naked except for their masks, which veil them. 
One of the women repeatedly warns him that he is in grave danger, but Fridolin refuses to 
leave, until the moment when he is exposed and, obliquely, threatened with death. 
Throughout the build-up to the orgy, there have been powerful suggestions that Fridolin 
would exchange his life for this sexual adventure. When a moment of hesitation occurs on the 
journey, he thinks: “My way lies forward, even were it to my death.” (DS, 43/T40) 79 Later, 
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when the masked woman begs him to leave, he replies: “No more than my life can be at stake 
(…) and to me at this moment you’re worth it.” (DS, 48/T, 44) When he is challenged and 
threatened with exposure, which would mean death, the masked woman offers to sacrifice 
herself for him. Fridolin proclaims once more: “Life is no longer worth anything to me if I 
have to leave without you.” (DS, 53/T, 48) Yet, ultimately, Fridolin fails to act on these 
words. Facing away from Fridolin, the woman tears off her mask and her costume. Her body 
is highly eroticized, but Fridolin never sees her face: 
Her dark costume fell away as if by magic, so that she stood there in all the radiance of her white body, 
and, taking hold of the veil wound about her brow, head and neck, with a (…) circular movement she 
removed it.  It sank to the ground, and her dark hair cascaded over her shoulders, breast and hips. (DS, 
53-54/T, 49) 
 
The erotic and death fuse here in a very seductive image of a naked, living body, viewed only 
from the back. Unable to prevent her death, Fridolin embarks on a quest for the identity of the 
mysterious woman. 
His quest to solve the mystery takes him to the morgue, where he encounters the dead 
body of a woman whom he suspects of being the woman who sacrificed herself for him. The 
scene which follows has powerful resonances of the “Uncanny” and, significantly, the sense 
of the “Uncanny” is focused on the representation of the woman‘s body. Initially, it is the 
deadness of the body which is emphasized: 
Was it her body?  That wonderful blooming body that yesterday had tortured him with longing? He 
looked at the yellowish wrinkled neck, noticed the two small girlish, yet slightly sagging breasts, 
between which the breastbone stood under the pale skin with gruesome clarity, as if the process of decay 
had already set in; followed the contours of her lower body. .. (DS, 93-94/T, 83) 
 
This, then, is the reality of death - and it is far from erotic. The body is ready for 
decomposition, the skeleton already visible. Swales argues that: 
As so often in Schnitzler, death functions as an intensifying factor in the sexual adventure.  One should 
note, however, that it is the notional presence of death, the image of death that heightens physical 
desire. The actuality of death destroys the magic of heightened sensuality.80 
 
Swales argues, therefore, that it is the image of death which is erotic, while the reality of 
death is not. What he overlooks, however, is what happens next in what is a pivotal moment 
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in the text. As Fridolin contemplates the dead woman’s body, something changes: 
 
Almost as if driven by some unseen power, Fridolin touched the woman’s brow, cheeks, arms and 
shoulders with both hands; then he intertwined his fingers with the dead woman’s as if to fondle them, 
and, stiff as they were, they seemed to be attempting to move and to take hold of his; indeed, he 
thought he could detect a faint and distant gleam in the eyes beneath those half-closed lids trying to 
make contact with his own; and, as if drawn on by some enchantment, he bent down over her. (DS 
94/T, 84) 
 
As though compelled by an unseen magical force, Fridolin begins to touch the dead body. 
Throughout Dream Story, Schnitzler invokes the metaphor of magic in order to express the 
notion of compelling unconscious forces which break through the surface of rationality and 
deprive the protagonist of rational control. His touch is an erotic touch, a longing to inhabit 
the dead body and bring it to life. He wraps his fingers around those of the dead woman, as if 
“to fondle them”, seeking a response. It then seems to him as though the fingers try to move 
and seize hold of his. For Fridolin, gazing at the body, the eyes acquire an animating gaze 
and look out at his. “As if drawn on by some enchantment,” Fridolin bends over to kiss the 
dead body. 
Dangerous magic, however. Through her erotic appeal, the dead woman embodies not 
only the attraction of death but the desire to pull him into a deathly embrace with her. Here 
we have a body which is animated, which is experienced by the narrator as coming to life. 
Yet it comes to life in order to deal death. Once again, the danger which that body represents 
is very real, although it is veiled by the shimmering language of magic and the erotic. For the 
threat which the dead body incarnates is none other than that of an attack on life itself, the 
envy of the dead for the living.81 Just like the flowers in “Flowers”, which come to life in 
order to pull the protagonist down into death with them, so the dead woman in Dream Story 
comes to life in order to lure Fridolin into a deathly embrace. The dead body is animated by 
the aggression of the Kleinian persecutor and that aggression presents itself as love for death. 
It is that love for death which is camouflaged by the language of the imagined sexual 
encounter. The animated dead female body, despite her erotic appeal, is not good news for 
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the male protagonist: she has come to get him and pull him down to death with her. The dead 
body takes on the life of a Kleinian persecutor, with a “faint and distant gleam” in her eyes 
and the sense of uncanny life shuddering through her. 
We can identify several strands which are inextricably intertwined here. First, the 
fusion of the erotic and death; sexual longing becomes a longing also for death. Second, the 
motif of the animated female corpse, the body of the dead woman which has come to 
“uncanny” life. Third, Schnitzler’s use of narrative perspective and frequent use of the 
subjunctive means that as readers we slip from inside Fridolin’s head, his own internal reality 
to outside it, which heightens the sense of the “Uncanny”. In addition, the uncertainty as to 
whether something is alive or not, which Freud highlights as one of the hallmarks of the 
“Uncanny”, is tangible. 
The spell is broken by the intrusion of another male voice, not, as Swales argues, by the 
demystifying reality of death itself, which is never really explored in Schnitzler’s text. The 
voice of Doctor Adler cuts into the imagined sexual encounter with the words, “What on 
earth are you up to?” 82 However, the sense of precariousness is very powerful. Without the 
intrusion of the male voice which brings him back to reality, we sense that Fridolin might 
irrevocably have been seduced into death. Similarly, the protagonist of “Flowers” might well 
have succumbed to the lure of the ghostly flowers without the intervention of Gretel. 
Much of Schnitzler’s prose fiction is peopled by ghostly female characters, a kind of 
living dead. These female characters are either already dead or about to be so: they were 
always intended for death, either through conscious or unconscious choice. Through 
examining the representation of Schnitzler’s “uncanny” female bodies, we can come to a new 
understanding of the “Uncanny” and of Schnitzler, one which is infused by Klein. I wish to 
argue that it is only through re-viewing Freud’s notion of the “Uncanny” in the light of 
Klein’s theory of aggression and the revenge of phantasied persecutors, that we can come to a 
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deeper understanding of what actually makes the “Uncanny” so frightening and so powerful. 
The aggressive and persecutory nature of Schnitzler’s female figures is crystallized in their 
encounters with the male protagonists and, in particular, through the encounters of these male 
protagonists with their “uncanny” dead bodies.83 Schnitzler’s “Flowers” and Dream Story 
offer us paradigmatic moments through which we can re-examine the “Uncanny” in the light 
of Kleinian aggression. This in turn leads us to uncover a hitherto unexplored facet of 
Schnitzler, namely a fascination with dead, ghostly female figures and bodies who, in 
phantasy, come to vengeful life in order to claim the lives of the men who have failed them.  
 
 
 80 
 
 
Works Consulted 
 
Bloom, Harold. “Freud and the Poetic Sublime.” In, Poetics of Influence: New and Selected 
Criticism, edited by John Hollander, 187-212. New Haven: Henry R Schwab, 1988. 
 
Bonaparte, Marie. The Life and Works of Edgar Allan Poe: A Psycho-Analytic Interpretation. 
Translated by John Rodker. London: Imago, 1949. 
 
Bowie, Malcolm. Freud, Proust and Lacan: theory as fiction. Cambridge University Press, 
1987. 
 
Bronfen, Elisabeth. Over Her Dead Body: Death, Femininity and the Aesthetic. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1992. 
 
David, Nicolette. Love, Hate and Literature: Kleinian Readings of Dante, Ponge, Rilke, and 
Sarraute. New York and Washington: Peter Lang, 2003. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Translated 
by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane. New York: The Viking Press, 1977. 
[L’Anti-Oedipe: Vol I, Capitalisme et schizophrénie. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1972.] 
 
Downing, Lisa. Desiring the Dead: Necrophilia and Nineteenth-Century French Literature. 
Oxford: Legenda, 2003. 
 
Freud, Sigmund. The Uncanny. Translated by David McLintock, 121-62. London: Penguin 
Books, 2003.  
 
Freud, Sigmund. “Das Unheimliche.” In Das Unheimliche: Aufsätze zur Literatur, 45-84. 
Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1963. 
 
Jürgensen, Christoph, Lukas, Wolfgang, and Scheffel, Michael, eds. Schnitzler Handbuch: 
Leben-Werk-Wirkung.  Stuttgart & Weimar: Verlag J.B. Metzlar, 2014. 
 
Hinshelwood, R.D. A Dictionary of Kleinian Thought. London: Free Association Press, 1991. 
 
Klein, Melanie, The Writings of Melanie Klein, 4 vols. London: Hogarth Press and Institute 
of Psychoanalysis. Abbreviated to WMK I-IV. 
 
----- “The Early Development of Conscience in the Child.” WMK I, 248-257. 
 
------ “Infantile Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulse.” 
WMKI, 210-19. 
 
------ “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States.” WMK I, 262-89. 
 
Laplanche, Jean and Pontalis, Jean-Baptiste. The Language of Psycho-Analysis. Translated 
 
 
 81 
by Donald Nicholson-Smith. London: The Hogarth Press, 1973. [Vocabulaire de la 
Psychanalyse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967.] 
 
Minden, Michael. “Stifter and the Postmodern Sublime.” In History, Text, Value: Essays on 
Adalbert Stifter, London Symposium 2003 edited by Michael Minden, Martin Swales and 
Godela Weiss-Sussex. Publications of the Institute of Germanic Studies, vol 88 (2006): 9-21. 
 
Meltzer, Donald. “The Kleinian expansion of Freudian metapsychology.” International 
Journal of Pycho-Analysis, no 62 (1981): 177-85. 
 
Poe, Edgar Allan. Essays and Reviews. New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 
1984. 
 
Rose, Jacqueline. “Negativity in the work of Melanie Klein.” In Why War?: Psychoanalysis, 
Politics and the Return to Melanie Klein, 130-40. Oxford, UK and Cambridge, USA: 
Blackwell, 1993. 
 
Royle, Nicholas. The uncanny. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003. 
 
Schnitzler, Arthur, Dead Men Tell No Tales and “Flowers.” In Arthur Schnitzler: Selected 
Short Fiction. Translated by J.M.Q. Davies, 44-59, 22-29. London: Angel Press, 1999. 
 
------- Dream Story. Translated by J.M.Q. Davies. London: Penguin Books, 1999. 
 
Schnitzler, Arthur. Gesammelte Werke: Die Erzählenden Schriften. Frankfurt am Main: S. 
Fischer Verlag, 1961. 
 
------ “Blumen.” Band I, 220-28.  
 
------  Die Toten schweigen.  Band I, 296-312. 
 
------  Traumnovelle. Band II, 434-504. 
 
Sinclair, Alison. The Deceived Husband: A Kleinian Approach to the Literature of Infidelity. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. 
 
Swales, Martin. Arthur Schnitzler: A Critical Study. Oxford and London: Clarendon Press, 
1971. 
 
Webber, Andrew. “Canning the Uncanny: The Construction of Visual Desire in Metropolis.” 
In Fritz Lang’s Metropolis: Cinematic Visions of Technology and Fear, edited by Michael 
Minden and Holger Bachmann, 251-271. Rochester, NY and Woodbridge, Suffolk: Camden 
House, 2000. 
 
Wright, Elizabeth. Psychoanalytic Criticism: A Reappraisal 2nd edn. Cambridge and Malden, 
MA: Polity Press, 1998. 
 
-------- Feminism and Psychoanalysis: A Critical Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 
 
 
 
 
 82 
 
 
 
                                                        
1See Freud, “Das Unheimliche”, and Klein.  All references to Freud’s “Das Unheimliche” will be to 
“Das Unheimliche” (1919), Das Unheimliche: Aufsätze zur Literatur. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 
Doppelpunkt 4, 1963, 45-84. All references to the English translation will be to “The Uncanny” 
(1919). Penguin Modern Classics, trans. David McLintock, London: Penguin Books 2003, 121-62. All 
references to Klein’s writings will be to The Writings of Melanie Klein, 4 vols, London: Hogarth Press 
and Institute of Psychoanalysis, abbreviated to WMK I-IV. For a Kleinian account of aggression, see 
Klein, “Infantile Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulse,” WMK I. 
See also, “A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,” WMK I. 
2 Freud, “The Uncanny,”148/“Das Unheimliche,” 70. 
3 I shall make use of the Kleinian spelling of phantasy, which begins with a ‘ph’ instead of an ‘f’. For 
Klein, phantasy is all-pervasive. Alison Sinclair in The Deceived Husband suggests that this unusual 
spelling denotes; “the transferential and unreliable nature of this experience of the world”, 7, n.12. 
4 Edgar Allan Poe, “The philosophy of composition”, in Essays and Reviews, 19. 
5 Downing, Desiring the Dead, 29. Downing gives an account of necrophilia in Nineteenth-Century 
French literature and defines necrophilia as follows: “Necrophilia thus becomes explicable as a 
desirous and idealizing relation to death, manifest in actual perversion or in representation.” 5. For a 
detailed account of Poe’s attraction to the female corpse in his work, see Bronfen, Over Her Dead 
Body, 326 – 36, 366 – 67. 
6 Bonaparte, The Life and Works of Edgar Allan Poe, 260. 
7 Bonaparte, The Life and Works of Edgar Allan Poe, 260. 
8 Swales, Arthur Schnitzler, 141. 
9 For a discussion of the body, see Elizabeth Wright, Feminism and Psychoanalysis, 35-40. 
10 Freud, “The Uncanny,” 124/“Das Unheimliche,” 46. 
11 Freud, 138/58. 
12 Freud, 138/60. 
13 Freud, 140/60. 
14 Freud, 148/70. 
15 Freud, 150/73-4. 
16 Freud, 145/67. 
17 For an account of the death instinct in Freud and Klein, see Hinshelwood, Dictionary, 266-70. See 
also Klein, “Early Development” in WMK I, 251. 
18 Minden, “Stifter,” 14-15. 
19 Klein, “Early Development,” 253. 
20 Royle, The uncanny, 108. 
21 Royle, 108. 
22 Paul de Man, quoted in Royle, 108. 
23 Freud, “The Uncanny,” 150. 
24 Meltzer, “Kleinian expansion,” 178. 
25 Royle, 7-8. 
26 Wright, Psychoanalytic Criticism, 131. 
27 Wright, 131. 
28 Wright, 132. 
29 Wright, 133. 
30 Wright, 134. 
31 Wright, 134. 
32 Wright, 134. 
33 Minden, “Stifter,” 9-21. 
34 Bloom, “Freud,” 196. 
 
 
 83 
                                                                                                                                                                            
35 Minden, “Stifter,” 16. 
36 Minden, 15. 
37 Minden, 14. 
38 Minden, 17. 
39 For an account of Kleinian theory, see David, Love, Hate and Literature, 3-10. 
40 See Royle, The uncanny and Webber, “Canning the Uncanny”. My argument pivots upon the 
notion that the relationship between Klein and literary texts has not yet been fully explored, while 
the Freudian, Lacanian and Jungian approaches have been more fully explored by critics. For an 
illuminating analysis of the potential of other psychoanalytic approaches, see Wright, Psychoanalytic 
Criticism. For an imaginative account of the uses of Freud and Lacan as theoretical tools, see Bowie, 
Freud, Proust and Lacan. 
41 Klein focused on the infant within the adult. 
42 David, Love, Hate, 3. 
43 For an explosive account of the radical potential of ‘partial objects’, see Deleuze and Guattari, 
Anti-Oedipus, 44. Here, Deleuze and Guattari argue that Klein failed to seize the radical implications 
of her own invention. For an account of the paranoid-schizoid position, see David, Love, Hate, 156-
66. 
44 Klein, “The Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States,” 262. 
45 Klein, “Infantile Anxiety-Situations,” 210-19. 
46 Klein does not reference the opera herself.  From her account it is clear that it is Ravel’s L’enfant et 
les sortilèges (1925). 
47 Klein, “Psychogenesis,” 210. 
48 Klein, 210. 
49 Klein, 210-11. 
50 Klein, 211. 
51 For a more detailed account of reparation, see David, Love, Hate, 5-6. 
52 See Hinshelwood, Dictionary, 138-155. 
53 Klein, “Infantile Anxiety-Situations,” 211. 
54 Klein, 211. 
55 Klein, 212. 
56 Klein, 214. 
57 Klein, “Psychogenesis,” 272. 
58 Wright, Psychoanalytic Criticism, 83-84. 
59 Rose argues in “Negativity in the work of Melanie Klein” that: “it has been too easy to politicize 
psychoanalysis as long as the structuring opposition has been situated between an over-controlling, 
self-deluded ego and the disruptive force of desire; that this opposition has veiled the more difficult 
antagonism between superego and the unconscious, where what is hidden is aggression as much as 
sexuality, and the agent of repression is as ferocious as what it is trying to control,” 142. 
60 Rose 144. 
61 Webber, “Canning the Uncanny,” 261. 
62 Webber, 261. 
63 Webber, 261. 
64 Webber, 267. 
65 Webber, 265. 
66 Webber, 266. 
67 Webber, 266. 
68 For a problematization of the “Uncanny” from a gender perspective, see Wright, Feminism and 
Psychoanalysis, 436-40. 
69 “It is with this individual quest for freedom above all else that Schnitzler is concerned.” Swales, 
Arthur Schnitzler, 40. 
70 For an illuminating study of the representation of the dead female body in patriarchal Western 
 
 
 84 
                                                                                                                                                                            
culture, see Bronfen, Over Her Dead Body. 
71 I shall be referring to “Flowers” in Arthur Schnitzler: Selected Short Fiction, trans. J.M.Q. Davies 
(London: Angel Books, 1999), 22-29. “Flowers” will be abbreviated to “F”.[“Blumen”, Die 
Erzählenden Schriften, I, (Frankfurt am Main: S.Fischer Verlag, 1961), 220-29. “Blumen” will be 
abbreviated to “B”.]   
72For Klein, the ability to mourn the lost loved object, the object lost in phantasy, means that the 
infant is able to internalize the lost good object.  Thus mourning is an intrinsic part of developing 
love and concern for the lost object. 
73 For an account of the depressive position and mourning, see Hinshelwood, Dictionary, 142-3. 
74 Swales, Arthur Schnitzler, 101. 
75 Swales, 101. 
76 “Carnations” and “violets” possess connotations of death in German and Austrian culture. 
77 For an account of “internal reality”, see Hinshelwood, Dictionary, 330-31. 
78 Swales, Arthur Schnitzler, 141. 
79 I shall be referring to Arthur Schnitzler, Dream Story, trans. J.M.Q. Davies (London:Penguin Books, 
1999). Dream Story will be abbreviated to DS. [Traumnovelle (Frankfurt am Main: S.Fischer Verlag, 
1961). Traumnovelle will be abbreviated to T.] 
80 Swales, Arthur Schnitzler, 141. 
81 Envy is a cornerstone of Kleinian theory. See David, Love, Hate, 7-8. 
82 DS, 84. 
83 Although in Schnitzler it is mainly the dead female figure which seems to come to life, we can also 
detect the same strain in the representation of dead male figures, for example in Dead Men Tell No 
Tales [Die Toten schweigen], where it is a dead male figure which haunts the female protagonist. 
 
 
 
